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What Is an “Acceptable” Rate
of Inflation? A Review of the
Issues
“Our strategy continues to be centered on moving toward, and ultimately
reaching, stable prices, that is, price levels sufficiently stable so that expec-
tations of change do not become major factors in key economic decisions.”
Alan Greenspan, Testimony fo House Committee on
Banking, Finance! and Urban Affairs, January 24, 1989
ECENT fears of increased future infla-
tionary pressures, heightened by high rates of
capacity utilization, have generated a large body
of commentary concerning what level of infla-
tion would be desirable or at least acceptable.’
While there appears to be a general consensus
that a rise in the rate of inflation is not desir-
able, whether or not many would agree with
Mr. Greenspan’s statement above is not clear
Indeed, his statement makes a stronger sugges-
tion that even the current rate of inflation is
not acceptable.’
This article points out three central issues for
determining what constitutes an “acceptable”
rate of inflation. The first issue concerns the
costs of inflation. The second issue is whether,
despite these costs, inflation’s benefits are suffi-
ciently large to justify some positive rate of in-
flation. The final issue concerns the costs of
reducing inflation. Even if there were convinc-
ing reasons for ultimately eliminating inflation,
some analysts would argue that a positive infla-
tion could be acceptable in the short-run; the
optimal time path along which a long-run goal
of zero inflation is achieved depends on the
temporary costs of adjustment to reach that
goal eventually.
WHAT ARE THE COSTS OF
INFLATION?
Examining the effects of intiation sheds light
on why price stabilization is a primary objective
of monetary policy. This section focuses on
‘See, for example, Clark (1989) and Stein (1989).
‘Mr Greenspan expressed this view more clearly in his
testimony to Congress In February 1989: “. ..let me
stress that the current rate of inflation, let alone an in-
crease, is not acceptable, and our policies are designed to
reduce inflation in coming years.” [Greenspan (1989),
p. 274.] Elsewhere, he has been quoted as suggesting
that the ultimate objective of the Fed is to eradicate infla-
tion [Murray (1989)].
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some of the relevant effects given existing in-
stitutional arrangements in the United States.3
These effects, as summarized in table 1, are
organized by their source: the effects arising
from anticipated (or expected) inflation and
those arising from unanticipated inflation (or
the difference between actual inflation and ex-
pected inflation) and the associated uncertainty
about future inflation.
The Effects of Anticipated
Inflation
Much of modern macroeconomic research has
been devoted to examining how expectations af-
fect economic decisions. In contrast to the idea
that only “surprises” or unanticipated events
can have real effects, economic theory suggests
that even fully anticipated inflation can distort
economic decisions. These “distortions” are said
to be the costs of anticipated inflation. A useful
way to focus solely on the effects of anticipated
inflation is to assume that the future sequence
of changes in the general price level is known
in advance.~
Anticipated inflation influences the allocation
of resources in the economy primarily through
two types of tax effects. First, inflation effective-
ly imposes a tax on money balances equal to the
‘For a more exhaustive list and detailed analysis of the ef-
fects of inflation, see Fischer and Modigliani (1978). Also,
Kessel and Alchian (1962) provide a useful discussion of
inflation’s consequences. For a survey of the earlier
literature concerning the theory of inflation, see Laidler
and Parkin (1975).
4lhis assumption is made purely for expositional ease.
When uncertainty is introduced in the discussion, the ef-
fects of anticipated inflation mentioned in this section are
simply added to those effects arising from the unantici-
pated component of inflation and those effects arising from
uncertainty. It should be noted that the assumption of cer-
tainty does not preclude a variable inflation rate.
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ings. For example, an individual holding $100
throughout 1988, when the inflation rate was
around 4 percent, lost about $4 in purchasing
power.’
Since inflation imposes a tax on money ba]-
ances it reduces individuals’ demand for
money.°Because individuals will attempt to
economize on money holdings during periods of
inflation by making extra trips to the bank or
automatic teller machine, inflation is said to
generate “shoe-leather costs.” But the costs of
the inflation tax are not merely the physical
resources and time expended to avoid the infla-
tion tax, as that term suggests. The total cost or
the “gross burden” of the inflation tax more im-
portantly includes the increase in the price paid
to maintain real money balances and the value
of lost services otherwise provided by money.
Inflation, however, generates revenue to the
government that indirectly accrues to individ-
uals. The “excess burden” is the difference be-
tween the total costs and the government’s rev-
enues. Under some plausible assumptions, a
5
rough estimate of this excess burden from a
“small” inflation tax of 5 percent is about $13.4
billion or about 0.3 percent of gross national
product (GNP) per year.’
The excess burden of the inflation tax on
money balances is only part of the total welfare
cost associated with inflation. The second type of
tax effect arises as anticipated inflation interacts
with the structure of the existing income tax
system, exacerbating the distortions contained
therein. Since the progt’essive income tax
system is not completely indexed against in-
creases in the price level, inflation will subject
individuals’ incomes to higher average and mar-
ginal tax rates. Even if wages fully adjust to in-
flation so that the real (before-tax) wage rate is
approximately constant, an individual’s real,
after-tax income will decline.’
Although one would expect that, through the
so-called “bracket-creep” effect, anticipated infla-
tion would influence and distort individual’s
labor supply decisions, empirical evidence on
the effects of marginal taxes suggests that an-
ticipated inflation has little effect on aggregate
‘Inflation as measured by the consumer price index for all
urban consumers was 4.4 percent during 1988, while other
measures indicate that inflation was between 3.0 percent
and 4.5 percent. The current dollar loss of purchasing
power of $100 is calculated by the following equation:
~ (iPp — -~-~? , where P is the general
“\P. P’,,/
price level in time t, Since the rate of inflation, it,, equals
~ ..:_!~ , the loss in purchasing power in current dollar
terms equals 100 ii,. As noted below, the tax on money
balances generates revenue to the government,
‘Another way to see why inflation reduces the demand for
money is by noting that inflation increases the opportunity
cost of holding those balances. The opportunity cost is the
revenue forgone by holding money rather than securities
yielding a nominal interest rate, A. (The assumption that
money does not yield interest is not important here. As
argued by Tatom (1979), among others, even checkable
deposits that pay interest are sublect to the inflation tax.)
Suppose, for example, that there is no expected future in-
flation. Then the nominal rate paid on a security is its real
yield, r. An individual holding $100 in cash balances for
transaction services forgoes the real interest payment,
$lOOr, that would have been obtained if he instead bought
a $100 bond. In this case, the opportunity cost of holding
money balances is r per dollar. Now suppose that inflation,
,, in the next period is expected to be positive. The
nominal yield on the bond A, will increase roughly by the
amount of expected inflation to compensate lenders for the
expected loss in purchasing power of the initial loan; the
nominal yield will equal the real rate plus an expected in-
flation premium. (Strictly speaking, A =(1 + r)(1 + n)-1.
Simply adding the real rate of interest and the rate of infla-
tion will be a reasonable approximation provided that the
product of the real rate of interest and the rate of inflation,
nit, is of a small order of magnitude.) The higher nominal
rate forgone by holding money implies that the opportunity
cost of holding money has increased.
flhis estimate is intended to give only a rough order of
magnitude of the excess burden of inflation. The estimate
assumes that the current stock of money (Ml) is about
$780 billion and that the interest elasticity of the demand
for money is -.15. This latter assumption means that when
the opportunity cost of holding money increases I percent,
the quantity of money demanded falls .15 percent. Thus,
assuming the real rate of interest is 3 percent, the demand
for money would increase by 25 percent to $975 billion if
inflation were zero. It should be noted that the estimate of
the welfare cost ignores the fact that total “tax” borne by
the individual money holder does not go entirely to the
government. Since the banking system receives part of the
revenue from the inflation tax through money creation, the
estimate above understates the excess burden. See Tatom
(1976, 1979) and Fischer (1981b) for more detailed discus-
sions of estimating the excess burden of the inflation tax
on money balances.
°lna preliminary study, Baye and Black (1988) table II, p.
480, estimate that the “bracket-creep-induced inflation tax
rate,” defined as the difference between the rate of
change in gross income necessary to keep utility constant
and the associated rate of change in consumption expen-
ditures, ranges from 0.2 percent to 2.4 percent between
1972 and 1981. Furthermore, they find that changes in the
tax code during this period, intended to mitigate the
bracket-creep effect, were largely offset by simultaneous
increases in Social Security taxes (pp. 481-82).
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labor supply.’ Furthermore, to the extent that
the current income tax system has become par-
tially indexed by recent tax reform, the effects
of inflation in terms of the bracket creep effect
have been partially mitigated.bo
Nonetheless, recent tax reform has not fully
insulated individuals from the tax effects of an-
ticipated inflation. Anticipated inflation produces
an overstatement of interest income subject to
taxation. The nominal interest rate required by
lenders includes two components. The first
component, r, is a payment to the lender for
not consuming today and, hence, constitutes in-
come. The second component, it, is a premium
to compensate the lender for the anticipated
lost purchasing power of the principal due to
inflation. Because the latter component serves to
preserve the value of the principal, it is not in-
come in an economic sense. Yet, like income, it
is taxed.
‘ro see how an increase in anticipated infla-
tion increases an individual’s tax liability for a
given before-tax real return, consider the
following example. Suppose, first, that no infla-
tion is expected and the marginal income tax
rate is 25 percent. A one-year loan that yields a
3 percent (real) return to an individual before
taxes generates an after-tax real return of 2.25
percent. If, instead, the anticipated rate of infla-
tion were 2 percent, with the real interest rate
on the one-year loan remaining at 3 percent,
and the nominal yield rising to S percent (the
real rate of interest plus the rate of inflation
that would be required when abstracting from
tax considerations), then the after-tax real rate
of return to the lender would fall to 1.73 per-
cent. A rise in the anticipated inflation rate to 5
percent would erode the expected (and actual)
return dramatically to TI percent.
Lenders will demand a nominal return higher
than the original real interest rate plus the rate
of inflation to be compensated for the increased
future tax liability arising from an increase in
anticipated inflation. In the example above, for
the lender to supply the same dollar amount of
loans as when expected inflation was zero, the
same after-tax real return of 2.25 percent
would be required; this, in turn, would require
a rise in the nominal return from 3 percent to
9.67 percent when expected inflation rises to 5
percent. Hence, the nominal rate of interest
must rise by more than the rate of inflation to
induce the lender to forgo the same amount of
current consumption. If, however, nominal in-
terest rates did not rise enough to keep the
after-tax real rate the same when inflation rises,
savings would be reduced. It has been estimated
that the distortionary effect of a 10 percent rate
of inflation on savings over a 20-year period
produces a total welfare loss (total cost net of
additional revenues to the government in pre-
sent value terms) of about 7 percent of current
savings or, assuming that savings is 10 percent
of GNP, about 0.7 percent of current GNP.’1
Tax incentives combined with anticipated in-
flation distort financial decisions. Because
nominal interest payments on debt are tax-
deductible and dividends are effectively taxed
twice, anticipated inflation will induce corpora-
tions to finance an expansion of their operations
by creating debt rather than issuing additional
stock. If nominal interest rates do not adjust to
anticipated inflation enough to maintain a fixed,
after-tax real rate of return, then an increase in
anticipated inflation can induce individuals to
finance a greater proportion of their consump-
tion and asset purchases with debt.” ‘rhis bias
for debt finance, which increases with antici-
pated inflation, could be costly if, by increasing
future debt obligation as a fraction of expected
future cash flows, it increases the chances of
future default.
‘See, for example, Hausman (1981), who finds that the tax-
induced effects on wages do not significantly reduce ag-
gregate labor supply. Inflation’s effect on the marginal tax
rate could similarly have an insignificant effect on labor
supply.
‘°Tatom(1985) discusses the impact of the partial indexa-
tion of the income tax system on real tax liabilities. As
discussed by Tatom, the currently used method of indexa-
tion does not fully mitigate the bracket creep effect
because the indexation oftax brackets is calculated using
past increases in the general price level. Furthermore,
some deductions, credits and adjustments that can be
made for tax purposes have maximum dollar limits or
nominal ceilings that are not indexed. Even assuming a
constant real income before taxes, an expected rise in the
price level implies that a larger portion of real income will
be subject to taxes. Without increasing the marginal tax
rate, anticipated inflation increases the average tax
liability.
‘1Fischer (1981b), p. 23. As he notes, however, the estimate
is rough and could be as large as 2 percent to 3 percent
of GNP under slightly different, although still plausible,
assumptions.
12Even if nominal rates fully adjusted to increases in an-
ticipated inflation so as to not affect the after-tax real
return, an increase in anticipated inflation decreases the
cost of debt finance to firms provided that the corporate
marginal tax rate exceeds the individual marginal tax rate,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUISThe impact of anticipated inflation on eco-
nomic behavior is not restricted solely to in-
flation-induced tax effects. Specifically, by
changing prices, some firms incur lump-sum or
“menu” costs. Even if these costs are small, real-
world price adjustments occur at discrete times
rather than continuously. Assuming that price
changes are not sychronized, anticipated infla-
tion (and deflation) can generate relative price
changes in the short run. Since these inflation-
induced relative price changes do not reflect
real, fundamental changes in the economy, they
can create a misallocation of resources, resul-
ting in a welfare loss in addition to the explicit
costs of changing prices.”
The Effects of Unanticipated Infla~
tion and Uncertainty
Unanticipated inflation also can result in a
misallocation of resources. Its impact on in-
dividuals’ behavior, however, is less obvious. In
particular, although unanticipated inflation pri-
marily redistributes wealth among people, it is
the uncertainty associated with these possible
future redistributions that distorts economic
behavior. Before discussing these distortionary
effects, this section focuses on the distributional
effects of unanticipated inflation.
‘I’o examine the distributional effects, while in-
itially abstracting from the effects of uncertain-
ty per se, suppose there is a one-time shock to
the level of inflation. The shock is temporary in
the sense that, after one period, the rate of in-
flation will return to the previously expected
time path.~~ This unanticipated inflation influ-
ences the distribution of wealth through con-
tracts that fix future nominal cash flows, espe-
cially debt contracts.
7
When debt contracts are fixed in nominal
terms, the main effect of unanticipated inflation
is to redistribute real wealth to net monetary
debtors at the expense of net monetary credi-
tors.” Not suspecting the possibility of a diver-
gence between actual and expected inflation, a
lender would demand a rate of return that com-
pensates him only for not consuming today and
for the lost purchasing power of the initial bor-
rowings due to anticipated inflation. When ac-
tual inflation exceeds anticipated inflation, the
lender unexpectedly suffers a loss on his loan;
the purchasing power of the return on the loan
falls below that expected at the time the loan
was made.
For example, suppose an individual, who ex-
pects zero inflation over the next period, re-
quires a5percent nominal (and real) return
next period in exchange for lending $100 today.
Regardless of next period’s inflation, the lender
will receive $105 in the next period. If there is
a 5 percent (unanticipated) inflation, then the
purchasing power of the $105 payment to the
lender is identical to that of the $100 lent. In
this case, the real net return is zero.
Just as unanticipated inflation erodes the real
purchasing power of the return from the loan,
it reduces the real liability of the debtor. Along
the same lines, if nominal wages specified in
labor contracts are fixed for an interval of time,
unanticipated inflation reduces an individual’s
real wage while increasing an employer’s in-
come net of the wage bill in real terms.
Although the redistribution of wealth due to
unanticipated inflation is important to the in-
dividual before and after the fact, it is not easy
to say anything meaningful about the welfare
implications of the realized or e~post redistrib-
“Mankiw (1985) demonstrates that, in the presence of even
small price adjustment costs, optimizing behavior by price-
setting firms can produce sticky prices that are inefficient
from a social welfare perspective in a deflationary period.
He shows, however, that sticky prices in an inflationary
period could be more efficient than fully flexible prices.
Since price-setting firms produce at lower-than-socially-
optimal levels, sticky prices in an inflationary period
reduce the wedge between actual and socially optimal out-
put levels.
“If the level of inflation were permanently increased above
its previously expected and actual level, but the possibility
of a future shock were arbitrarily close to zero, the discus-
sion to follow is virtually unchanged. It should be noted,
however, that the discussion implicitly assumes that, when
contracts are signed, individuals do not perceive the
possibility of shock in the future. Hence, the discussion is
about a countenfactual and can be misleading. Specifically,
if individuals suspected that such a shock might occur
(with a positive probability), they would adjust their
behavior, so that the terms of the contract reflect the
possibility of a future shock. The implicit assumption is
made for expositional purposes, and the possible ad-
justments in behavior are discussed in turn.
“A net monetary creditor’s (debtor’s) holdings of fixed
nominally denominated assets are greater (less) than his
holdings of nominally denominated liabilities. See, for ex-
ample, Kessel and Alchian (1962). Alchian and Kessel
(1959) present evidence that the market value of equity of
firms classified as net monetary creditors tends to fall dur-
ing inflationary periods. The converse holds for net
monetary debtors.
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utions.16 The losses due to unanticipated infla-
tion are matched by others’ gains, so that there
is no net change in wealth associated with the
redistribution. In an expected or ex ante sense,
however, the possible (and arbitrary) redistribu-
tions have aggregate welfare implications, be-
cause they distort behavior, especially that of in-
dividuals who dislike risk.
Uncertainty associated with inflation manifests
itself quantitatively and qualitatively in both
nominal and real contracts. in the presence of
fixed nominal wage contracts, uncertainty asso-
ciated with future inflation can depress the
supply and demand for labor. As greater infla-
tion uncertainty increases the difficulties and
costs of forecasting future inflation, wage nego-
tiations become more complex and costly. Con-
sequently, without nominal wage indexation
when future inflation becomes more uncertain,
individuals and firms are less willing to lock
themselves into fixed nominal contracts.
But the effects of inflation uncertainty will be
partially alleviated as labor markets adjust.
Greater uncertainty about future increases in
the general price level gives risk-averse individ-
uals and firms an incentive to increase the
degree of indexation in wage contracts and to
reduce the duration of the contract. The in-
creased degree of indexation and the shortening
of the length of the nominal contracts increases
the responsiveness of nominal wages to unan-
ticipated inflation.” Nevertheless, a recent em-
pirical study, which accounts for the greater
wage indexation induced by greater inflation
uncertainty, indicates that an increase in infla-
tion uncertainty similar to that which occurred
roughly between the 1960s and the 1970s
would reduce growth in real GNP in the long
term by approximately 2 percent.”
Inflation uncertainty also affects the demand
and supply of nominally denominated debt of
different maturities. Risk-averse lenders might
be less willing to purchase a long-term nominal
bond over short-term nominal bonds. As fore-
casting future inflation becomes more difficult
with longer time horizons, the opportunity cost
of holding a longer-term nominal bond is more
uncertain. In addition, a given permanent unex-
pected movement in the rate of inflation will
have a gt’eater impact on the market value of
the longer-term bond and, consequently, a
greater impact on the realized rate of return
from selling that bond. To compensate lenders
for taking on additional risk, the required
nominal yield on a bond with a longer maturity
will embody a greater risk premium.
The uncertainty associated with future infla-
tion creates an element of uncertainty about
real, future rates of return on all investments
whose returns are not fixed in real terms. The
more uncertain are the future rates of inflation,
holding all else constant, the greater the risk
premia for all bonds of any given maturity.” As
the required nominal yields on instruments of
all maturities increase with greater inflation
uncertainty, the cost of capital financed by
nominal debt increases. Not all investments,
however, are fixed in nominal terms. The risk-
averse individual can hedge, at least partially,
against unanticipated inflation by investing in
projects or holding financial instruments whose
actual and expected real returns are relatively
“Such a value judgment would depend on the specified
social welfare function—in particular, the relative weights
assigned to each individual’s utility. Nonetheless, the
decline in wealth experienced by some in a period of
positive unanticipated inflation does not necessarily pro-
vide sufficient justification, in terms of a Pareto efficient
criterion, for a “forced” transfer of resources to restore
the initial distribution of wealth.
‘7When the economy is subject to real as well as to nominal
disturbances, however, complete wage indexation is not
desirable. See Gray (1976) for example. Also, see Holland
(1984b) for a more detailed discussion of the effects of in-
flation uncertainty on labor markets.
“Holland (1988), p. 478-80. This is a cumulative effect oven
a number of years (e.g. 2 to 6 years). In general, however,
there is mixed evidence about the effects of intlation
uncertainty on output growth. For example, Jansen (1989)
finds that the conditional variance of inflation as a
measure of inflation uncertainty has no significant impact
on real output growth.
“Taylor (1981), among others, finds a positive relation bet-
ween the average rate of inflation and the variability of in-
flation across nations and through time. This stylized fact,
however, does not imply any causal link between the two.
Moreover, greater variability does not imply greaten uncer-
tainty. Nevertheless, preliminary evidence indicates that in-
flation variability is positively related to uncertainty, as
measured by the variance of the forecast errors from
survey data on from an econometric model for predicting
future inflation, on as measured by the dispension of infla-
tionary expectations within a survey. But Jansen (1989)
recently found no statistical relation between inflation and
the conditional variance of inflation, See Taylor (1981) and
Holland (1984a), who review the existing evidence on the
relations between average inflation, the variability of infla-
tion and uncertainty.
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independent of future rates of inflation, such as
human capital, homes and corporate stocks.”
Even a complete hedge against unanticipated in-
flation would not eliminate the welfare costs of
uncertainty, however. Substantial transaction costs
can be incurred by those who attempt to eliminate
the risk associated with future inflation from their
portfolios. In any case, as individuajs and firms at-
tempt to hedge against unanticipated movements
in the general price level, inflation uncertainty can
distort asset accumulation and the aggregate
allocation of resources.’1
Another distorting feature of the uncertainty
associated with price movements arises when in-
formation about the source of price movements is
not available without costs. If information were
costless to obtain, the appropriate response to a
given increase in prices is clear. For example, an
unanticipated temporary increase in observed
prices correctly attributed to monetary policy (a
nominal factor), rather than to an increase in de-
mand for some goods relative to others (a real fac-
tor), would not alter the decisions of producers in
the absence of nominal rigidities. If it is costly,
however, to distinguish between general price
movements produced by nominal factors from
those created by real factors, price movements
will be “noisy.” Confusion about the source of a
given price movement and the appropriate
response will produce excessive relative price
variability, resulting in a misallocation of
resources.”
WHY NOT A ZERO RATE OF
INFLATION?
While any positive inflation has a large num-
ber of distortionary effects, a zero inflation rate
might not necessarily be desirable—even in the
long run. First, the various measures of infla-
tion (for example, the consumer price index and
the GNP implicit price deflator) do not control
perfectly for quality improvement of products
over time. To the extent that the lower and
higher quality versions of goods are treated as
comparable, the difference in their prices will
be measured as inflation; the resulting measure
will tend to overstate the actual inflation rate.
Given this positive bias in inflation measures, it
has been suggested that a2percent inflation
rate measured by the usual price indexes would
be associated with roughly stable prices.” More-
over, some would contend that inflation also
has some important benefits like providing a
cheaper source of government revenue or
creating highem- output and employment, so that
the long-run desirable rate of inflation is not
zero, but positive.
Optimal Taxation
Some have argued that inflation is required
for optimal taxation.’~The inflation tax provides
‘°Whilehomes appean to be good hedges against expected
and unexpected inflation, the evidence for human capital
is inconclusive, at least for the long nun. Moreover, a
puzzling negative relation between stock returns and ex-
pected as well as unexpected inflation has been widely
documented, but not resolved. See, for example, Fama
and Schwent (1977).
“See Jaffee and Kleiman (1977) fon a more detailed discus-
sion of the effects of inflation uncertainty on the allocation
of resources,
22To be sure, relative price variability need not be a cost. To
the extent that relative price movements signal real distur-
bances to the economy, those movements contain impor-
tant information facilitating an efficient allocation of
resources. Fischer (1981 a) provides a summany of com-
peting appnoaches to explaining the relation between the
average inflation rate and relative price variability. Taylor
(1981) and Fischer (1981b) do not find evidence indicating
a causal relation between inflation and variability of
relative prices. Rather, Taylor (1981) and Fischen (1981a)
find evidence consistent with the notion that the positive
relations between average inflation, the variability of infla-
tion and relative price variability in the 1970s have been
driven by supply shocks (for example, energy and food
shocks). Taylor (1981) also finds that accommodative
monetary policies aiming to stabilize output and employ-
ment in light of neal disturbances to the economy con-
tributed in a large pant to the increased variability of infla-
tion in the 1970s, Furthermore, Fischer (1981a) concludes
that policy shocks that could have created confusion about
the source of price movements do not appear to be
associated with lower aggnegate economic activity.
“Friedman (1969), p. 47. According to Friedman (1969),
however, a negative inflation rate (about 2 percent defla-
tion) correctly measured would be optimal. In this case, a
zero inflation rate, as measured by the various price in-
dices would be a desirable target. (See Alchian and Klein
(1973) for a critical assessment of the appropriateness of
the price indexes for policy.)
‘4See, for example, Phelps (1973). The government’s
revenue fnom the production of money is the nominal rate
of interest times the stock of the monetary base (total
neserves plus currency). Using the tact that the ratio of the
monetary base to the money stock (Ml) is about 40 per-
cent and assuming that the neal interest rate is about 3
percent, the revenue with a5percent inflation tax on a
stock of Ml of $780 billion is about $25 billion pen year in
current dollar terms, The inflation tax alone generates
$15.6 billion pen year. It is important to note that unan-
ticipated inflation implicitly genenates additional revenue to
the government (a net monetary debtor) through its effect
on the real value of public debt. By reducing the purchas-
ing power of interest payments on outstanding debt, unan-
ticipated inflation lowers the real liability of the government
and the amount of revenue to be naised through income
taxes.
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the government an alternative source of reve-
nue to other explicit and distorting taxes—for
example, income taxes.” The theory of optimal
taxation suggests that, to finance a given level
of pubhc expenditures, the government should
trade off the costs of distortions arising from in-
flation against those arising from other taxes.”
From this perspective, the optimal inflation tax
rate equates the marginal cost per dollar of
revenue from the inflation tax and from other
distorting taxes.
Recent empirical evidence on the marginal
costs of the inflation tax and other taxes, how-
ever, casts doubt on the relevance of the opti-
mal taxation theory to justify a positive rate of
inflation. These studies suggest that the margin-
al cost per dollar revenue of the inflation tax at
any positive rate of inflation exceeds that for
alternative taxes set at plausible rates.” In other
words, inflation does not necessarily provide a
cheaper source of government revenue. Fur-
thermore, the interaction between inflation and
the distortions produced by the tax system sug-
gests that the marginal cost of income taxes
could be positively related to the rate of infla-
tion; thus, lowering the inflation tax not only
would reduce the welfare losses associated with
the inflation tax, but make income taxation a
cheaper source of government revenue.”
The Inflation and Unemployment
Trade-off
The older argument used to justify positive in-
flation hinges on the so-called Phillips curve
trade-off between inflation and unemployment.
Figure 1, which depicts the apparent trade-off
that emerged in the 1960s, could be interpreted
as suggesting that, by tolerating a higher level
of inflation, society could benefit from lower
levels of unemployment.
One possible story behind such an interpreta-
tion is that an expansionary monetary policy
that increases the general price level can in-
crease output if nominal wages are relatively
fixed. With fixed nominal wages, a rise in infla-
tion can induce firms to increase output. This
incentive arises because the firm’s marginal
profit—that is, the change in real revenues net
of the change in the real wage bill realized by
expanding output—increases with unanticipated
inflation. If nominal wages were not fixed, they
would adjust quickly to the increase in prices to
maintain a given real wage rate; output and un-
employment would be essentially independent
of inflation. But, according to the trade-off view,
the existence of nominal wage contracts means
that, by generating inflation, the government
can decrease the rate of unemployment and
thereby enhance social welfare.
The possibility of exploiting the trade-off be-
tween inflation and unemployment with mone-
tary policy, however, depends on the way in
which inflationary expectations are formed and
incorporated into nominal wages. if inflation is
correctly anticipated and incorporated into
wage contracts, then real output will be in-
dependent of inflation in the long run. Even if
the government were to generate inflation un-
ZSjf thene were non-distorting taxes, then the excess burden
of the inflation tax discussed above would render inflation
an “inefficient” tax. But, in the absence of non-distorting
taxes as a source of revenue to the government, the op-
timal rate of inflation could be positive. Browning (1987),
table 1, p. 16, estimates that in 1984 the total welfare cost
associated with the distortionary effects of the labor tax
ranged from $55.9 billion to $212.6 billion under vanious
assumptions. As a pencentage of tax revenues from labor,
the welfane loss ranged from 7.5 percent to 28.5 percent,
well below the inflation-induced welfare loss as a percen-
tage of revenues from the inflation tax (about 86 percent).
“In recent studies, Mankiw (1987) and Poterba and
Rotembeng (1988) test the implications of the hypothesis
that the government optimally trades off the distortions
from explicit income taxes and inflation, While Mankiw
finds preliminary evidence supporting the hypothesis for
the United States, Poterba and Rotembeng, who look at
diffenent nations, do not find conclusive evidence. That the
hypothesis is not fully supported by the data might be a
result of the maintained assumption that the distortionary
effects of the explicit tax system are independent of the
distortionany effects of the inflation tax. Given the discus-
sion above, this assumption seems inappropriate.
“For example, Tatom (1976), p. 20, shows that marginal
cost pen dollar revenue of the inflation tax, assuming that
the elasticity of demand for money is — .15, is 44 percent.
This estimate is not conditional on the inflation rate, but it
is highly sensitive to the assumed elasticity of demand for
money. For example, an elasticity of — .25 would imply a
marginal cost of 83.33 percent. Browning (1987), table 2,
p. 21, shows that the marginal welfane cost from taxes on
labor earnings ranges fnom 9.9 percent to 33.2 percent
underthe assumption that labor supply is not highly re-
sponsive to the marginal income tax rate (see footnote 9).
~ should be noted, however, that since the marginal cost
of taxes on labor earnings is positively related to the
marginal tax rate, the theory of optimal taxation in light of
the evidence on marginal welfare costs does not
necessarily imply a zero rate of inflation. Nevertheless, if
the marginal cost ofthe inflation tax were positively related
to inflation, the optimal rate of inflation would mone likely
be zero.





expectedly, the increase in output and decrease
in unemployment would only be transitory.
Subsequent wage changes would restore the
original level of the real wage. As a conse-
quence, the original profit rate would be re-
stored, with output and unemployment return-
ing to their original equilibrium or “natural”
levels; the trade-off between unemployment and
inflation would not exist in the long run.”
indeed, figure 2, which plots the combinations
of unemployment and inflation in the 1970s and
the 1980s, does not support the existence of a
long-run trade-off. While a short-run trade-off
might exist, whether or not it is operative for
the purpose of enhancing social welfare is un-
clear. Attempts to “fool” individuals systematic-
ally, by continuously creating surprise inflation
so as to exploit the short-run trade-off, would
not improve the welfare of all individuals
because, although some individuals experience
unexpected wealth gains, others suffer wealth
losses. In addition, attempts to repeatedly fool
individuals would increase the costs associated
with inflation due to increased inflation
uncertainty.
Moreover, as individuals and firms adjust to
the higher inflation uncertainty, the trade-off
becomes less favorable, because greater infla-
tion uncertainty increases incentives for indexa-
tion. With greater wage indexation, a given
2’See Fischer (1977), for example. The notion that neal out-
put and employment are independent of the inflation rate
































amount of surprise inflation will have a smaller
transitory effect on output and employment as
nominal wages become more responsive to ac-
tual inflation. Accordingly, the trade-off be-
comes steeper. If attempts to exploit the trade-
off also increases average inflation, the trade-off
shifts outward, so that a given rate of inflation
will be associated with a higher rate of
unemployment.
WHAT ARE THE COSTS OF
REDUCING INFLATION?
The suggested benefits of inflation seem hard-
ly compelling to justify any positive, sustained
inflation. The long-run desirability of achieving
stable prices, however, does not necessarily
mean that the current rate of inflation is unac-
ceptable. Specifically, the latter discussion sug-
gests that policies to reduce inflation and ulti-
mately achieve the long-run desirable inflation
rate can be costly. That is, any short-run trade-
off between inflation and unemployment implies
that anti-inflationary policies will produce tem-
porary increases in unemployment.
Are The Goats Too High?
Table 2 shows the inflation rate, as measured
by the GNP implicit price deflator, and the
civilian unemployment rate; it indicates that the
large reduction in inflation from 1979 to 1988
was accompanied by significantly large rates of
unemployment. These observed high rates of
unemployment, however, can overstate the
costs of the anti-inflationary policy. Regardless
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path, temporary unemployment is an efficient
response to fundamental changes in the
economy, as individuals search for new jobs.
Consequently, the “natural” rate of unemploy-
ment (the rate of unemployment consistent with
a steady inflation) can be positive. It has been
estimated that, assuming the natural rate of
unemployment is 6 percent, the decline in infla-
tion from 9 percent in 1980 to 3.2 percent in
the middle of 1987 was associated with about
2.4 percentage points of “excess” unemployment
pet’ percentage-point reduction in inflation.30
Similarly constructed estimates have been us-
ed to suggest that reducing inflation is unaccep-
table on efficiency grounds:
The damage that high unemployment does to
economic efficiency is enormous and inadequately
appreciated. By contrast, the harm that inflation
inflicts on the economy is often exaggerated; and
those costs which are not mythical can be mini-
mized or even eliminated by indexing. Hard-
headed devotion to the principle of efficiency thus
argues for worrying less about inflation and run-
ning a high-pressure economy in which jobs are
plentiful.”
By definition, excess unemployment is ineffi-
cient, because it implies that resources, other-
wise available to increase consumption oppor-
tunities, have been wasted. But excess un-
employment is only a transitional cost as the
economy adjusts to the long-run desirable infla-
tion rate. When the inflation goal is finally
achieved and sustained, the excess unemploy-
ment will disappear. In contrast, the welfare
costs associated with inflation are incurred
indefinitely—that is, each year in which the
economy’s institutional features (for example,
the explicit tax system) make the distortionary
effects of inflation discussed above relevant.”
The Optimal Time Path of
Reducing Inflation
Among the important questions that policy-
makers must face is the timing of anti-inflation-
ary policy actions to reach the long-run desir-
able inflation rate. Given the initial inflation
rate, the speed with which the desirable infla-
tion rate is reached partly determines the cost
of that policy.
One recent study shows that there am’e large
differences in the costs of policies that vary
with respect to their timing”. On the basis of
various models, this study calculates the costs of
several policies to bring inflation from 7.5 per-
cent to zero. The costs of the policies are esti-
mated in terms of output losses using a relation-
ship known as Okun’s law that translates each
percentage point of excess unemployment into a
3.2 percent reduction in real output. For exam-
ple, employing a Phillips curve model, this study
‘°Fniedman(1988), p. 66. Each percentage point of
unemployment above the natural rate (on that in a “fully
employed” economy, with a steady inflation rate) con-
stitutes a percentage point of “excess” unemployment. Of
course, because the natural rate of unemployment is not
observed and is subject to change during the evolution of
the economy subject to permanent and transitory real
shocks, one could argue that Friedman’s estimate
understates (on overstates, for that matter) the welfare loss
associated with the reduction of inflation in the l9BOs.
31 Blinder (1987), p. 65.
“Of course, not all anti-inflationary policies can be justified.
Rather, without a careful evaluation of the costs and
benefits of reducing inflation, a monetary policy that pro-
duces an inflation above (on below) the optimal rate does
not easily follow from an efficiency criterion, As pointed
out by Meyer and Rasche (1980, p. 14), among others,
however, if the benefits from eliminating inflation (on iden-
tically, the costs of sustaining inflation) increase at the
same nate of neal potential output, then any anti-
inflationary policy would be justified, irrespective of the
policy’s costs, provided that the costs are finite and that
the initial gain from such a policy is positive.
“Meyer and Rasche (1980).
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found that a gradual policy to eliminate infla-
tion over a 23-year period could generate a dis-
counted cumulative output loss of $1 trillion (in
1972 terms), whereas a policy that reached the
inflation goal in 11 years could result in a dis-
counted cumulative output loss of $1.5 trillion.’~
The relation between the time path and the
costs of the policy depends on the dynamic rela-
tion between unemployment and inflation. In
addition to the degree to which the economy is
indexed, this dynamic relation depends on the
credibility of the anti-inflationary policy and ex-
pectations about future inflation. If, as assumed
in the Phillips curve model, expectations depend
on past inflation, a given inflation-reducing
policy will be more costly; with nominal rigid-
ities in the economy and a sluggish adjustment
of expectations, the short-term trade-off be-
tween inflation and unemployment can be large.
To achieve a specific reduction in inflation over
a given time span can require higher levels of
unemployment and greater output losses. If in-
flationary expectations are forward-looking and
the policy is credible, however, the link bet-
ween inflation and unemployment is weaker; in
this case, unemployment is less responsive to
movements in inflation. Accordingly, credible
anti-inflationary policies will be less costly in
terms of output losses than incredible ones.”
The time path of the anti-inflationary policy is
also important because it determines the speed
with which the gains from such a policy are
realized fully. For example, a gradual policy that
eliminates inflation over 50 years might not
generate significant output losses, but the pre-
sent discounted value of the benefits from that
policy could be infinitesimally small.
CONCLUSION
Analyses of the acceptability of any particular
positive inflation should start by asking what is
the optimal rate of inflation. in reviewing the
various effects and costs of inflation, this article
questions the validity of the notion that any
positive inflation could be desirable as a long-
run phenomenon. The surprisingly large num-
ber of distortionary effects resulting from infla-
tion weakens the possible justifications for sus-
tained positive inflation.
The long-run desirability of zero inflation
need not imply, however, that a positive rate of
inflation is never acceptable for any period. The
transitional costs of reducing inflation over a
short period could be considerably large relative
to the benefits of quickly eradicating inflation.
But the costs of fighting the current inflation do
not preclude the desirability of an anti-inflation-
ary policy, either. Indeed, the steady reduction
in monetary aggregate growth since 1987 (mea-
sured by Ml, M2 or the adjusted monetary
base) suggests that the trade-off has been faced,
at least implicitly. In any case, the acceptability
of an inflation in excess of the long-run desir-
able rate depends on the appropriately
measured net benefits of alternative paths to
achieve the ultimate inflation goal.
REFERENCES
Alchian, Anmen A., and Reuben A, Kessel. “Redistribution of
Wealth Through Inflation,” Science (September 4, 1959),
pp. 535-39.
Alchian, Armen A., and Benjamin Klein. “On a Correct Mea-
sure of Inflation,” Journal ofMoney Credit and Banking
(Part 1, February 1973), pp. 173-81.
Baye, Michael R., and Dan A. Black, “The Micnoeconomic
Foundations of Measuring Bracket Creep and Other Tax
Changes:’ Economic Inquiry (July 1988), pp. 471-84.
Blinder, Alan S. Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-Minded Eco-
nomics for a Just Society (Addison-Wesley, 1987).
Browning, Edgar K. “On the Marginal welfare Cost of Taxa-
tion:’ American Economic Review (March 1987), pp. 11-23.
Clank, Lindley H. Jr. “Why Don’t We Aim for Zero Inflation?”
Wall Street Journal, February 9, 1989.
Cukienman, Alex. “Central Bank Behavior and Credibility:
Some Recent Theoretical Developments,” this Review (May
1986), pp. 5-17,
Fama, Eugene F., and G. William Schwent, “Asset Returns
and Inflation:’ Journal of Financial Economics (November
1977), pp. 115-46.
Fischer, Stanley. “Relative Shocks, Relative Price Variability,
and Inflation[ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
(1981a), pp. 381-431.
“Ibid., pp.7-8.
“Taylor (1983) shows that even if overlapping wage con-
tracts temporarily fix nominal wages, a policy that gradual-
ly reduces inflation can be relatively costless provided that
expectations about future inflation are rationally formed
and everyone believes that the policy will actually be im-
plemented. See Cukierman (1986) and references cited
therein for analyses of the institutional and economic fac-
tons that tend to detract from the credibility of anti-
inflationary policies. These analyses suggest that, without
a perfect resolution of the cnedibihty problem, the economy
is likely to be characterized by an “inflationary bias,”
Fischer and Summers (1989) show how by decreasing the
marginal costs of inflation, the government, recognizing
the importance of its reputation, can neduce that bias.
Without neputational considerations, however, reducing the
costs of inflation can increase the inflationary bias,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUIS15
______ “Towards an Understanding of the Costs of Infla-
tion: IL” in Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzen, eds., The
Costs and Consequences ofInflation, Cannegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy (North-Holland, Autumn
1981b), pp. 5-42.
“Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and
the Optimal Money Supply Rule’ Journal ot Political
Economy (February 1977), pp. 191-206.
Fischer, Stanley, and Franco Modigliani. “Towards an Under-
standing of the Real Effects and Costs of Inflation:’
Weltwirtschaftliches Archly (Band 114, 1978), pp. 810-33.
Fischer, Stanley, and Lawrence H. Summers. “Should
Governments Learn to Live With Inflation?” American
Economic Review (May 1989), pp. 382-87.
Friedman, Benjamin M. “Lessons on Monetary Policy from
the 198os:’ Journal of Economic Perspectives (Summer
1988), pp. 51-72.
Friedman, Milton, “The Optimum Quantity of Money” The
Optimum Quantity ofMoney and Other Essays (Aldine,
1969), pp. 1-50.
Gray, Jo Anna. “Wage Indexation: A Macroeconomic Ap-
proach:’ Journal ot Monetary Economics (April 1976), pp.
221-35.
Greenspan, Alan, “1989 Monetary Policy Objectives’ Tes-
timony to the Congness (February 21, 1989) in Federal
Reserve Bulletin (April 1989), pp. 272-77.
Hausman, Jerry A. “Labor Supply:’ in Henry J. Aaron and
Joseph A. Pechman, eds., How Taxes Affect Economic
Behavior (Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 27-72.
Holland, A. Steven. “Indexation and the Effect of Inflation
Uncertainty on Real GNP,” Journal of Business (October
1988), pp. 473-84.
_______ - “Does Higher Inflation Lead to More Uncertain In-
flation?” this Review (February 1984a), pp. 15-26.
_______ - “The Impact of Inflation Uncertainty on the Labor
Market,” this Review (August/September 1984b) pp. 21-28.
Jaffee, Dwight M., and Ephnaim Kleiman. “The Welfare Im-
plications of Uneven Inflation,” in Enik Lundberg, ed., Infla-
tion Theory and Anti-Inflation Policy (Macmillan, 1977), pp.
285-307.
Jansen, Dennis W. “Does Inflation Uncertainty Affect Output
Growth? Further Evidence,” this Review (JulylAugust 1989),
pp. 43-54.
Kessel, Reuben A., and Anmen A. Aichian. “Effects of Infla-
tion,” Journal otPolitical Economy (December 1962),
pp. 521-37.
Laidler, David E., and Michael Pankin. “Inflation: A Sunvey[
Economic Joumal (December 1975), pp. 741-809.
Mankiw, N. Gregory. “The Optimal Collection of Seignionage:
Theory and Evidence[ Journal of Monetary Economics
(September 19B7), pp. 327-41.
_______ “Small Menu Costs and Large Business Cycles: A
Macnoeconomic Model of Monopoly” Quarterly Journal ot
Economics (May 1985), pp. 529-37.
Meyen, Laurence H., and Robert H. Rasche, “On the Costs
and Benefits of Anti-Inflation Policies:’ this Review
(February 1980), pp. 3-14.
Murray, Alan. “Fed’s Goal is to Cut Inflation to Zero,
Greenspan Says,” Wall Street Journal. March 28, 1989.
Phelps, Edmund S. “Inflation in the Theory of Public
Finance,” Swedish Journal otEconomics (March 1973),
pp. 67-82.
Poterba, James M., and Julio J. Rotemberg. “Inflation and
Taxation with Optimizing Governments:’ National Buneau of
Economic Research Working Papens Senies, 2567 (Apnil
1988).
Stein, Herbert. “Inflation is Here, Still:’ Wall Street Journal,
March 6, 1989.
Tatom, John A. “Federal Income Tax Reform in 1985: Index-
ation’ this Review (February 1985), pp. 5-12.
_______ “The Marginal Welfane Cost of the Revenue From
Money Creation and the ‘Optimal’ Rate of Inflation2 The
Manchester School (December 1979), pp.359-68.
_______ - “The Welfare Cost of Inflation:’ this Review
(November 1976), pp. 9-22.
Taylor, John B. “Union Wage Settlements During a Disinfla-
tion:’ American Economic Review (Decemben 1983),
pp. 981-ga
- “On the Relation Between the Variability of Infla-
tion and the Average Inflation Rate,” in Karl Bnunner and
Allan H. Meltzer, eds., The Costs and Consequences ofIn-
flation, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy (North-Holland, Autumn 1981), pp. 57-86.
JULY/AUGUST 1989